To this end, the students planned to form 'large, English guild-style industrial co-operatives to produce and supply goods Koreans eat, wear and use, and to make these the organs of production and consumption for the whole of Korea.' This development stimulated debate in the nationalist newspapers, especially the Donga Daily (IBF H Va), while lecture tours proceeded in the provinces to propagate the idea, attracting reported crowds of five to six thousand. 33 The Korean Youth Association ( *ffi t fl In P'yongyang, the streets had hosted pre-New Year rallies of up to seven 'thousand people. The police complained that such gatherings were too large and ordered Kim S6ng-op, Chairman of the P'y6ngyang branch, to limit the New Year's Day parades to two separate corps of fifty marchers each. The parades took place as instructed, but reportedly o0,000 people representing over sixty groups gathered afterwards in the P'y6ngyang Christian College grounds to hear the Rev. Kim Tong-won speak on the subject of self-sufficiency.49 Rallies were held also by several other district branches, in S6ngch'on and Suan in South P'y6ngan, Talsong and Yangsan in South Ky6ngsang, and Sunch'on in South Cholla. In Kunsan (North Cholla) and Pusan, large parades were led by the Kisaeng girls.50
In the wake of such resounding success, a Seoul director, Na
Kyong-s6k, a bright student fresh from studies in Tokyo, proposed immediate action on two fronts: formation of consumers' co-operatives and propagation of the movement's theoretical basis.51 The Seoul Board of Directors met on 22 February and commissioned Na, Lee Sun-t'aek, an economist trained in Japan, and the Youth Association leader Kim Ch'61-su, to examine the co-operative movements of a variety of countries.52 They reported a month later that in Korea's situation it would be advisable initially to establish co-operatives from above and steadily encourage mass-participation until the movement became spontaneous. An estimated 5,000 Yen would be required to initiate the scheme, for which a tax on members was proposed. 
Nationalist Basis of the Products Promotion Society
The explicit rationale for this economic nationalism was self-support, self-sufficiency, self-reliance (A f1E X f: hereafter I shall italicize 'selfsufficiency' whenever it occurs as a translation of these four characters). In order to promote Korean Products we must make it our aim to buy and use goods made by Koreans, and also unite to manufacture and supply those goods we need. Unless we come to our senses and exert ourselves in this way, how can we expect to maintain our livelihood and develop our society?
The 1923 In a long article of some io,ooo words,"0 Yun Yong-nam took the critics to task for sloppy, vague use of terminology: capitalist, proletariat, bourgeois and so on. He pointed out that Korean society differed clearly from the social situation such words had been coined to describe. In Korea they were mere words and one could not inspire genuine class-consciousness by opposing phantoms. Since the critics (Chu) argued that there is no true capitalist class among Koreans, they ought logically to conclude that there exists no real proletariat, i.e., a class defined in contrast and opposition to capitalists. Or if the proletariat is taken (erroneously) to mean the impoverished, then almost all Koreans belong-or very soon will. Yun proceeds with possibly a 'heads-I-wintails-you-lose' argument. He challenged his opponents to do some real research into the Korean situation, to pay heed to the material context of thought and harness theory to reality. Consciousness had to be practical, and the Society was able to produce this for it would 'more or less clarify the distinctions between the propertied and productive classes.' The reality was that 60% of land and at least 80% of wealth was in Japanese hands. Since statistics indicated that this trend was accelerating as Korea's overall wealth increased, it is here that action could be taken. 
self-extinction. Again, Yun suggests that Koreans were all 'proletarian'
together. But supposing there were a bourgeoisie, Yun explained that the Society should properly be understood as a warning to them and a demand that they make sacrifices and work for the good of all. They alone had the know-how and funds to establish the economic base for any economic movement at all. Na Kyong-sok published his reply under the name Kong-min (t:Q;) in four articles printed in the Donga Daily.12 He opened his argument by countering Chu Chong-gon's charge that the Society's aims were impossible. The Society, he maintained, was 'a movement generated by the undeniable actual problems in Korea' whose urgency Chu in Tokyo had failed to understand. The movement did exist, and the fact that Koreans had rallied to resist approaching economic extinction could not be irrelevant to the question of the possibility of success. Despite the obvious severe limitations imposed by political powerlessness, doing nothing was not an adequate response. Na implied that this economic movement was not just one but the only alternative, and an incontestable duty.
Na Kyong-sok admitted that the movement could be construed as an alliance imposed by a bourgeoisie threatened with ruin on a proletariat lacking clear class-consciousness. But like Yun Yong-nam, he believed that the Korean bourgeoisie had perforce become proletarian in effect. Endowed with relatively good intellectual training, they could be the heralds of a real proletarian movement even if as a bourgeois swan-song. The unpropertied class was always the most vulnerable, but it was a non-sequitur to conclude that the Korean Products Promotion Society was therefore harmful to proletarian interests. For one thing, Korea had to progress from manual, cottage and non-diversified rural industries to mechanized industry to survive, and this was not in violation of any socialist principle. For another, the Society was not simply a boycott movement, but aimed to awaken consciousness of economic facts and issues. The practice of selling one's labour to industry was one of the real defects of the basic social structure, but was a problem as yet remote from the common people's present plight: corpses cannot unite. If the critics would only take the formulae of historical materialism seriously they would realize that the suffering of the proletariat and the intense development of the productive forces were expressly stated to be necessary phases. Proletarian consciousness cannot develop in solo; that would not be dialectical.
RATIONALE OF KOREAN ECONOMIC NATIONALISM
Finally, Na accused Chu of confounding social and political revolutions. Russia experienced a political but not a social revolution because the conditions of the latter did not exist. Therefore Russia had to impose state capitalism to generate the missing necessary productive power. All three of Trotsky's requisites of a successful social revolution113 were also lacking in Korea, where a growth in consciousness accompanying increased productive power was a necessity. Na failed to see how a movement to use and produce native goods would threaten this growth rather than promote it. The greatest threat to the proletariat lay in proposing political confrontations when it was in no position to carry them through.
To summarize, Yun and Na argued that political, not economic, action was impossible in Korea's circumstances; that, in any case, political change did not equal or guarantee socio-economic transformation; that since Koreans had lost virtually any semblance of an economic base, the Society was a direct and most relevant response to Korean realities; and that rather than undermining the consciousness of an as yet hardly existent proletariat, the movement was the only hope of any such consciousness appearing at all. Thus the primary tasks were to encourage people to use native goods where practical and to transform the 'idlers', those with capital and skills, into producers.
Evaluation of the Debate
The defence of the Society given by Na Kyong-s6k and Yun Yong-nam could make it difficult to identify the precise ideology of the movement. What does one make of an organization that was not officially socialist it is not difficult to see that it was the moral factor which made working sense of the synthesis. But the affinity must not be pushed too far, for there were real differences which prevented most Christians from becoming genuine Marxist socialists (or communists) and which suggested a Christian/ communist antithesis. Koreans who were Christian and socialist held Christianity to be 'true' in a way socialism was not. A distinction was made between Marxist analysis, and Marxist philosophy which was interpreted as rigid economic determinism and monistic materialism involving propositions of necessary historical laws. Na Ky6ng-s6k clearly spoke of these 'laws' with tongue in cheek when challenging his critics to take their communist creed seriously; he called himself after all an ethical socialist. As a movement, the Society rejected a political-revolutionary or a social-revolutionary approach. If some were socialists, none were at that time communists. 131 The very moralism which turned Christians to socialism as a specific position they could well adopt, was at the same time a hindrance to their accepting the Marxist metaphysic. As discussed above, their moral viewpoint extended to the origins of Korea's present plight, which they attributed to moral and spiritual decay. Given such a divergence between this religious and the communist explanations of the causes of Korea's problems, some incompatibility between their respctive solutions to the problems was inevitable. The issue between these solutions was a sensitive moral one. For radical socialists subscribing to Marx's prediction that revolution would proceed only after intensified misery 130 One must allow for the fact that in citing these persons Cho was answering a Tong 147 The Protestant Church was also strong in the cities, especially in the north. In I930 it was estimated that Io% of P'yongyang attended Presbyterian Churches alone, while in S6nch'6n to the west fully half of its I3,ooo-strong population was reckoned to be in churches on Sundays.148 The communist attack on popular religions which also visibly inspired much of the nationalist leadership could not have greatly impressed the ordinary Korean.
Conclusion
The basic, consistent rationale of the economic nationalism of the Korean Products Promotion Society was the belief that through moral, mental and practical training together with a campaign for responsible unity among all classes of Koreans, the people would avoid economic extinction and gradually reconstruct a viable economic base from which to influence society and politics, that is, achieve 'self-sufficiency'. The 
